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Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and the August 16, 1993 request of the Utah Court of 
Appeals for a response from defendants/appellees to the Petition 
for Rehearing ("Rehearing Petition", or "Reh. Pet.") filed by the 
plaintiffs/appellants ("Plaintiffs"), these defendants/appellees 
("State Defendants"J1 respectfully submit this response. 
I. THE JULY 9f 1990 AMENDMENT TO THE JUNE 6, 1989 ORDER IN 
HARRIS REINSTATED ONLY A CAUSE OF ACTION AND RELATED 
FACTS WHICH WERE NOT, AND ARE NOT, AT ISSUE IN THE 
INSTANT CASE, EITHER IN THE COURT BELOW OR IN THE 
APPEAL BEFORE THIS COURT, AND THEREFORE THE UTAH 
SAVINGS STATUTE CANNOT BE APPLIED. 
In its opinion dated July 20, 1993/ this Court affirmed the 
lower Court's dismissal of Count I of the complaint, finding 
Count I had not been filed within the time allowed under Utah 
Code Ann- § 78-12-40 (1993). This Court determined Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-40 (1992) ("Utah Savings Statute"), the statute 
cited by Plaintiffs to preserve Count I, could not be invoked, 
because all causes of action Harris2, which Plaintiffs used to 
invoke the Utah Savings Statute with respect to Count I, had been 
dismissed with prejudice by Order of the Harris Court dated June 
6, 1990 ("Judgment of Dismissal") (Addendum 1 hereto). 
1
 The term "State Defendants" is the same designation used 
for these defendants/appellees in their initial appellate brief. 
The State Defendants are: the State of Utah; the Utah Department 
of Financial Institutions; George Sutton, individually, as Utah 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions, and as Trustee of the 
retained assets of Murray First Thrift and Loan; and Elaine B. 
Weis, individually, and as former Utah Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions. 
2
 Harris, et al. v. Weis, et al.. Case No. C87-0041S 
(United States District Court for the District of Utah). 
1 
In their Rehearing Petition, Plaintiffs correctly point out 
the Judgment of Dismissal was later amended. Plaintiffs insist 
this means the cause of action in Harris on which they rely to 
invoke the Utah Savings Statute was thus dismissed "otherwise 
than on the merits", so they may invoke the Utah Saving Statute 
to preserve Count I. 
Plaintiffs are correct in stating the Judgment of Dismissal 
was amended. On July 9,3 1990, the Hon. David Sam entered an 
Order under Rule 60(b)(1) ("Rule 60(b)(1) Order") (Addendum 2 
hereto), F.R.C.P., granting the relief the Harris plaintiffs had 
requested. However, it is important to examine that Rule 
60(b)(1) Order and the related pleadings and orders, as set forth 
in the record before the instant Court, to see just what relief 
the Harris plaintiffs in that action requested, and what relief 
Judge Sam granted at that time. 
In his September 30, 1988 "Ruling and Order" (Rec. at 148-
57) (Addendum 3 hereto), Judge Sam made his findings, and then 
ruled: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the first, second, third, 
fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth (as to derivative 
claims and as to direct claims against the non-state 
defendants), ninth, and eleventh claims of the amended 
complaint, together with the corresponding claims of the 
second amended complaint, are dismissed on the merits and 
with prejudice. 
3
 Plaintiffs state Judge Sam entered this Rule 60(b)(1) 
Order on July 20, 1990. [Reh. Pet. at 2.] Although it is not a 
material point, the copy of the Order in the record before this 
Court which contains the language quoted by Plaintiffs in their 
Rehearing Petition is dated July 9, 1990, and was entered on July 
11, 1990. [Rec. at 260-61.] 
2 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims against the 
State of Utah and its officers in their official 
capacities are dismissed on the merits and with 
prejudice. 
This order does not dismiss the eighth claim of the 
amended complaint as replaced by the eighth claim of the 
second amended complaint, insofar as it asserts a claim 
against the state defendants in their individual 
capacities, nor does it dismiss the tenth claim of the 
amended complaint as replaced by the ninth claim of the 
second amended complaint. Aside from these exceptions, 
all claims and this entire action are hereby dismissed on 
the merits and with prejudice as to all defendants. 
Defendants are entitled to their costs. 
(Emphasis added.) (Rec. at 156-57.) 
Six months later, several of the defendants in Harris moved 
for entry of judgment dismissing all claims with prejudice. On 
April 21, 1989, Judge Sam entered the following "Ruling" 
(Addendum 4 hereto):A 
4
 Whether Judge Sam's April 21, 1989 Ruling — dismissing 
ALL CLAIMS against ALL DEFENDANTS ON THE MERITS AND WITH 
PREJUDICE — was intended to supersede his September 30, 1988 
"Ruling and Order" — which would not have dismissed certain 
counts involving the State defendants in their individual 
capacities — need not be argued here. That Ruling, and the 
motion(s) which led to it, does negate, however, the insinuations 
in Footnote 1 of Plaintiffs' Rehearing Petition, which implies 
some sinister motive to the State defendants in not submitting 
their Order based upon the Court's September 8, 1988 Ruling and 
Order until after Plaintiffs' counsel had withdrawn. At last 
count, since the Commissioner took possession of the business and 
property of MFT&L on July 22, 1982, Plaintiffs had used well over 
40 different lawyers at various phases of their disputes with the 
Commissioner and related entities. The "Who's In, and Who's Out" 
maneuvers of Mr. McDonald and Mr. Leedy, with respect to the 
filing of the First, Second, and Third Amended Complaints in the 
Harris proceedings (see September 30, 1988 "Ruling and Order"), 
illustrates how difficult it probably would have been for counsel 
for the State defendants NOT to have submitted a proposed order 
at a time shortly after one of Plaintiffs' counsel had just 
withdrawn — no matter when State defendants' counsel might have 
submitted a proposed order. As the April 21, 1989 Ruling shows, 
however, this was not a case of State defendants' counsel waiting 
for seven months after Judge Sam had entered his September 30, 
1988 "Ruling and Order" before State defendants' counsel 
submitted an order implementing that "Ruling and Order" (and, as 
3 
On March 31, 1989, several defendants moved for 
entry of judgment dismissing all claims with prejudice in 
the above entitled matter. The time for responding to 
defendants' motion having now expired without any 
opposition having been filedr and it appearing to the 
court that all claims in the case have now been 
dismissed, defendants' motion is granted. The court 
requests the movants to coordinate with other defense 
counsel to prepare an appropriate final order and 
judgment for the court's signature and to circulate the 
same for approval as to form pursuant to Rule 13(e) of 
the Civil Rules of Procedure. 
(Rec. at 158. ) 
Subsequently, on May 18, 1989,5 counsel for the State 
Plaintiffs would now have us believe, until after Plaintiffs' 
counsel had withdrawn from this case). Rather, on March 31, 
1989, six months after the entry of the "Ruling and Order", 
"several defendants moved for entry of judgment dismissing all 
claims with prejudice in the above entitled matter", and, twenty 
days later, when no objections had been filed to the motion, 
Judge Sam entered a "Ruling" granting the motion. The June 5, 
1989 "Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice" was not in response 
to Judge Sam's "Ruling and Order" of September 30, 1988, but was 
rather in response to the April 21, 1989 "Ruling" of Judge Sam 
granting of the motion(s) of "several defendants", which 
motion(s) had been filed on March 21, 1989. Judge Sam had before 
him an entirely separate motion. Unfortunately, the motion(s) 
filed by the "several defendants" are not in the record before 
the instant Court, so there is no way to determine whether those 
"several defendants" raised points in the motion(s) which 
convinced Judge Sam to revise his thinking in his September 30, 
1988 "Ruling and Order" and decide ALL CAUSES OF ACTION with 
respect to ALL DEFENDANTS should be dismissed with prejudice. 
This apparently was not the case, since Judge Sam did amend his 
July 5, 1989 "Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice" through his 
July 9, 1990 Rule 60(b)(1) Order. However, the "several 
defendants" having made their motion (which one assumes was 
supported with a "Memorandum of Points and Authorities"), and no 
objection having been filed thereto, it was certainly reasonable 
for counsel for those "several defendants" to assume Judge Sam 
had been influenced by their arguments and had changed his mind 
about not dismissing the State defendants in their individual 
capacities or certain claims against those State defendants. 
Thus, no sinister motive can be imputed to counsel for the State 
defendants, or counsel for any of the other defendants, in 
Harris. 
5
 The date on the certificate of mailing shows the proposed 
order was mailed to counsel of record on May 18, 1989. (Rec. at 
163.) The date stamp on the copy in the record shows it was 
4 
Defendants6 submitted to all counsel a proposed "Judgment of 
Dismissal with Prejudice". Judge Sam signed this Judgment of 
Dismissal on June 5, 1989. (Rec. at 161.) The Judgment provided: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
that all claims in the Amended Complaint, together with 
the corresponding claims of the Second Amended Complaint 
are dismissed with prejudice. 
(Rec. at 161-62.) 
At that point, all causes of action in the First and Second 
Amended complaints had been dismissed with prejudice. The Harris 
Plaintiffs recognized this, because they had to petition Judge 
Same under Rule 60(b)(1) to amend the Judgment of Dismissal to 
reinstate a cause of action. On July 9, 1990, Judge Sam signed 
the Rule 60(b)(1) Order. That Order, in its entirety, reads as 
follows: 
Plaintiffs, Gary S. Harris, et al., have moved this 
court for relief from the June 5, 1989 Judgment of 
Dismissal to the extent that it relates to the ninth 
claim of the second amended complaint which alleges a 
state law claim for defamation. 
This court has already indicated in its Order dated 
February 27, 1990, that it did not intend to dismiss that 
claim with prejudice but that dismissal was only for lack 
of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the relief requested by 
plaintiffs is hereby granted. 
(Emphasis supplied.) (Rec. at 260.) 
Thus Judge Sam only granted the relief reguested by 
"Plaintiffs, Gary S. Harris, et al.", and that relief reguested 
was only with respect to the "June 5, 1989 Judgment of Dismissal 
received in Judge Sam's office on May 19, 1989. 
6
 Christensen, Jensen & Powell and the Utah Attorney 
General's Office represented the State defendants, and Kipp & 
Christian represented the State's insurance carriers. 
5 
to the extent that it relates to the ninth claim of the second 
amended complaint which alleges a state law claim for defamation" 
(emphasis added). Plaintiffs did not request relief with respect 
to the June 5, 1989 Judgment of Dismissal to the extent it 
relates to "the eighth claim of the amended complaint as replaced 
by the eighth claim of the second amended complaint, insofar as 
it asserts a claim against the state defendants in their 
individual capacities", even though Judge Sam had also ruled to 
that effect in his September 30, 1988 Ruling and Order. Since in 
his Rule 60(b)(1) Order Judge Sam granted only the relief 
requested, it follows he did not amend his June 5, 1989 Judgment 
of Dismissal to reinstate "the eighth claim of the amended 
complaint as replaced by the eighth claim of the second amended 
complaint, insofar as it asserts a claim against the state 
defendants in their individual capacities". 
The ninth claim of the Second Amended Complaint (Addendum 5 
hereto) shows it relates only to certain defamatory statements 
allegedly made about Gary S. Harris, a plaintiff in Harris, by 
former Commissioners of Financial Institutions Elaine B. Weis and 
George Sutton, and by Darwin M. Larsen and Ed H. Throndsen. 
(Rec. at 381-86.) The ninth claim in the Second Amended 
Complaint has nothing to do with MFT&L, or the Plaintiffs in the 
instant appeal, or any of the facts surrounding MFT&L or any of 
the Plaintiffs in the instant appeal1 That limited cause of 
action in the ninth claim was also recognized by from Judge Sam's 
Rule 60(b)(1) Order, in which Judge Sam says "the ninth claim of 
6 
the second amended complaint . . . alleges a state law claim for 
defamation." 
The eighth claim in the Second Amended Complaint arguably 
could relate to the Complaint filed with the Court below in the 
instant appeal — the eighth claim was for damages under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for actions allegedly taken by at least some of the 
State Defendants in the instant appeal. Some of the Plaintiffs 
in the instant action were the same as some of the Plaintiffs in 
Harris, and some of the facts arguably were the same. HOWEVER, 
plaintiffs in Harris did not ask Judge Sam to amend his June 6, 
1989 Judgment of Dismissal to reinstate the eighth claim, and 
thus it remains "dismissed with prejudice". Nor do the State 
Defendants believe the Harris plaintiffs could, at this late 
date, successfully submit another Rule 60(b)(1) motion to Judge 
Sam for him to again amend his June 6, 1989 Judgment of 
Dismissal. Through their motion which resulted in Judge Sam's 
July 9, 1990 Rule 60(b)(1) Order, plaintiffs in Harris showed 
they had knowledge of the June 6, 1989 Judgment of Dismissal. 
The Harris plaintiffs also showed they knew some of the 
provisions of the June 6, 1989 Judgment of Dismissal did not 
comport with Judge Sam's September 30, 1989 Ruling and Order; 
however, the Harris plaintiffs asked Judge Sam only to amend the 
June 6, 1989 Judgment of Dismissal to reinstate the ninth claim, 
relating only to the alleged defamation of Gary Harris; they did 
not ask the Court to amend the June 6, 1989 Judgment of Dismissal 
to reinstate the eighth claim, which related to MFT&L and some of 
the Plaintiffs in the instant appeal. 
7 
Therefore, as State Defendants stated in their brief and at 
oral argument, the allegations with respect to a breach in Harris 
were dismissed with prejudice by that Court, and the instant 
Court was correct when it affirmed the dismissal by the Court 
below of Count I, since that part of Harris on which the 
Plaintiffs in the instant case relied to invoke the Utah Savings 
Statute was dismissed by Judge Sam with prejudice in his June 6, 
1989 Judgment of Dismissal. 
II. PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF RECONSIDERATION OF THE 
AFFIRMATION BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OF DISMISSAL 
OF COUNT TWO IS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 
PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 
In dismissing Count II of the Complaint, this Court 
recognized the obligation which Count II alleged the State 
Defendants as to have breached as having arisen on or about June 
13, 1983, at the conclusion of the six month period after 
execution by all the relevant parties of the Purchase and 
Assumption Agreement ("P&A"). In their Rehearing Petition, 
however, Plaintiffs now assert the Court incorrectly failed to 
recognize Plaintiffs had argued in Paragraph XXXI of their 
Complaint: 
Alternatively, the P & A Agreement contained an implied 
promise that Sutton and the DFI would turn over the 
retained assets to MFT&L and terminate their role in 
connection therewith at the earliest possible time 
consistent with Sutton's7 statutory responsibilities. 
7
 Presumably, Plaintiffs mean "the Commissioner's statutory 
responsibilities", rather than "Sutton's statutory 
responsibilities", since Mr. Sutton not only was not Commissioner 
on December 13, 1982, when the P&A Agreement was signed (he was 
Commissioner from April 11, 1987 to and through May 31, 1992), he 
wasn't even employed by the Department of Financial Institutions 
of the State of Utah at that time. 
8 
Plaintiffs assert there has always been a question of fact 
as to whether the P&A Agreement included a certain letter, dated 
November 5, 1982, which contained language supposedly requiring 
the Commissioner to surrender possession of any retained assets 
of MFT&L six months after the execution of the P&A Agreement. 
Plaintiffs argue this factual dispute is the basis of their 
factual assertion in Paragraph XXXI of their Complaint, and 
assert Paragraph XXXI presented an alternative under which the 
Commissioner's obligation to turn over any retained assets did 
not arise on June 13, 1983, but rather at some point apparently 
much later, which was at "the earliest possible time consistent 
with Sutton's statutory responsibilities". Plaintiffs now inform 
the Court they "could indeed 'prove a set of facts in support of 
[their] claims' which would not be time-barred." (Reh. Pet. at 5 
(brackets in original).) 
This issue is raised for the first time in the Petition for 
Rehearing. An issue which was not adequately raised and ruled 
upon in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal. Rees v. Intermountain Health Care,. 808 P.2d 1069, 1075-
76 (Utah 1991); Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ, 797 p>2d 
412,413 (Utah 1990); Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development 
Co., et al., 659 P.2d 1040, 1043-44 (Utah 1983). Furthermore, 
even if the issue could have been raised on appeal, Plaintiffs 
waived their right to raise it by not raising it in their initial 
brief. See Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d 392, 395 
(Utah 1980). An appellate court will ordinarily not consider 
issues raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing. 
9 
State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1112 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); Lockhart Company v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 
648 (Utah 1982), As such, this argument must be rejected. In 
none of the several pleadings Plaintiffs filed with the Court8 
below did they make this argument, or even hint at it. Nor did 
Plaintiffs raise this point in either their initial appellate 
brief or their reply brief, or at oral argument. Aside from 
putting the above-quoted language into Paragraph XXXI of their 
Complaint, and repeating it verbatim in their factual allegations 
in paragraph 17 of their initial brief9, Plaintiffs never 
referred to this language or asserted Paragraph XXXI might allege 
facts constituting still another breach in Count II. 
The placement of the factual allegations in Count II and 
within the "Statement of Facts" in Plaintiffs' initial brief is 
instructive in analyzing Plaintiffs' argument a new breach was 
alleged in Paragraph XXXI. Summarized, the allegations in 
Paragraphs XXIX through XXXXII of the Complaint (and paragraphs 
15-24 of the Statement of Facts in Plaintiffs' initial brief) 
are: 
8
 Plaintiffs filed the following pleadings below: 
"Complaint" (Rec. at 2-48); "Response to Motion to Dismiss" and 
"Memorandum of Points and Authorities" (Rec. at 93-181); 
"Response to Motion to Dismiss" and "Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities" (Rec. at 182-298); "Supplemental Memorandum in 
Response to Motion to Dismiss Filed by DFI, Sutton and Weis; and 
Reply in Support of Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint; 
and Motion to Strike Notice to Submit for Decision" (Rec. at 334-
408). 
9
 Plaintiffs repeated verbatim most of the facts alleged in 
their Complaint verbatim in their "Statement of Facts" in their 
initial brief. 
10 
XXIX The P&A Agreement required the Commissioner to 
turn over the retained assets of MFT&L within 6 
months after the P&A Agreement was signed 
XXX The Commissioner breached the requirement in 
Paragraph XXIX by not turning over the assets 
XXXI Alternatively, the P&A Agreement contained an 
implied promise Sutton would turn over the assets 
XXXII Sutton and DFI agreed not to impede the sale or 
development of the Bel Marin Keys Property ("BMK") 
XXXIII Plaintiffs have performed all their obligations 
under the P&A Agreement 
XXXIV Despite repeated demands by Plaintiffs, Sutton and 
DFI refused to turn over any retained assets 
XXXV These paragraphs detain the alleged sale of BMK, 
through and how the sale of BMK by Sutton allegedly 
XXXXII violated the terms of the P&A Agreement 
One is left to wonder whether Count II alleged one, two, 
three breaches. For example, Plaintiffs' initial brief stated: 
Like Count One, Count Two alleges a cause of action for 
the breach of a written contract, i.e., the P & A 
Agreement. The breaches are alleged to have occurred 
between May and November of 1987. 
In this statement, Plaintiffs appear to assert the alleged 
"breaches" asserted Count II occurred "between May and November 
of 1987", which would seem to mean the sale of BMK. This seems 
rather inconsistent, however, with the numerous arguments in 
Plaintiffs' pleadings in the Court below, and in Plaintiffs' 
briefs on appeal, which assert the claim of breach in Count II 
was kept alive under the Utah Savings Statute by Nelson10 and 
Harris. Nelson was filed May 30, 1986 (Plaintiffs' initial brief 
10
 Frank A. Nelson, et al. v. First Security Financial, 
Inc., et al., Case No. C86-2894 (United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California). 
11 
at 17), so it obviously couldn't refer to alleged breaches which 
would take place in May through November of 1987. Nor could 
Harris, which was filed January 22, 1987 (Plaintiffs' initial 
brief at 19). Rather, the breaches alleged in Nelson and Harris 
both had to refer to the alleged breach of the P&A Agreement at 
the end of the six month period after December 13, 1982. 
Presumably, the breach referred to in Paragraph XXXI does 
not refer to the sale of BMK, for the following reasons: 
a. As pointed out above, Plaintiffs made their the 
specific allegations regarding the BMK sale in eight (8) separate 
paragraphs in Count Two of the Complaint, repeated these 
allegations in other pleadings filed with the Court below, and 
repeated the allegations in their initial and reply briefs filed 
on appeal. Thus the specifics of the allegations relating to the 
sale of BMK were known to the Court below and to this Court, and 
both rejected the assertion the breach occurred when BMK was 
sold, determining instead the breach occurred at the end of the 
six-month period which began December 13, 1982. 
b. In their Rehearing Petition, Plaintiffs do not assert 
the BMK sale constituted the breach they claim to have asserted 
in Paragraph XXXI. 
c. Sequentially, in Count Two of the Complaint, the 
assertion in Paragraph XXXI immediately follows the paragraphs 
which allege the Commissioner was required to turn over the 
assets within 6 months after the signing of the P&A Agreement. 
There are three more paragraphs before the sale of BMK begins 
being discussed. 
12 
d. As pointed out above, in their initial brief, and in 
their reply brief, Plaintiffs argue the breach they assert in 
Count II IS the sale of BMK. 
e. The wording of Paragraphs XXX and XXXI does not 
indicate Plaintiffs thought there were two different of breaches; 
rather, the wording of these two paragraphs indicates Plaintiffs 
believed the Commissioner was obligated to return the assets to 
the Plaintiffs, either (1) within six months after the signing of 
the P&A Agreement, as expressly required by the November 5, 1982 
letter, or (2) when the Commissioner had fulfilled his statutory 
responsibilities, as impliedly required by the P&A Agreement 
itself. Again, Plaintiffs argued the first scenario in other 
pleadings before the lower Court and in its initial and reply 
briefs on appeal, but Plaintiffs never raised the alleged breach 
of the second scenario until they submitted their Rehearing 
Petition, 
To what breach, then, does the allegation in Paragraph XXXI 
refer? To six months after December 13, 1982? If so, this Court 
has already determined Count II was filed beyond the statute of 
limitations- To the sale of BMK in 1987? If so, this Court has 
already correctly determined the alleged breach actually took 
place June 13, 1983, with the sale of BMK in 1987 being just a 
further result of that breach. To still a third alleged breach? 
If so, it has been raised for the first time in the Petition for 
Rehearing, and must therefore be rejected by this Court. 
In reality, Paragraph XXXI appears to have been a fall-back 
position in the event a court were to determine the November 5, 
13 
19 82 letter was not a part of the P&A Agreement. Regardless, the 
position Plaintiffs now appear to take — that Paragraph XXXI 
asserts a third breach in addition to the one which took place on 
June 13, 1982, and the one which took place in November of 1987 -
- was never argued in the Court below nor on appeal, and is 
inconsistent with the positions Plaintiffs took whenever Count II 
was discussed or argued. 
III. EVEN SHOULD THE COURT REVERSE ITSELF ON EITHER OR BOTH OF 
ITS RULINGS ON COUNT I AND COUNT II OF ITS JULY 20, 1993 
DECISION, THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE DISMISSAL OF BOTH 
COUNTS BY THE COURT BELOW FOR ANY OF THE NUMBER OF 
ADDITIONAL REASONS PRESENTED BY DEFENDANTS. 
Should this Court determine it was in error when it issued 
its July 20, 1993 opinion, either as to Count I or Count II, or 
both, the State Defendants still submit this Court should affirm 
the dismissal by the Court below for each of the reasons set 
forth by the State Defendants in their initial brief, and at oral 
argument. Perhaps the most compelling reason for dismissal is 
the assets of MFT&L retained by the Commissioner were always 
under the jurisdiction of the Court with jurisdiction over the 
MFT&L proceedings.11 The Commissioner never did anything with 
any asset of MFT&L without first submitting a petition to the 
MFT&L Court, giving notice to all interested parties (including 
all the Plaintiffs in the instant proceedings), and receiving the 
approval of the MFT&L Court. While the MFT&L Court could only 
reverse the determinations of the Commissioner if the MFT&L Court 
11
 In re the Possession by the Banking Commissioner of 
Murray First Thrift and Loan Company, Case No. 820905951 (Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah). 
14 
found those determinations to be "arbitrary, capricious, 
fraudulent, or otherwise contrary to law" (Utah Code Ann. § 7-2-
12(1) (Supp. 1993), the MFT&L Court was well aware of the P&A 
Agreement; indeed, that Court had originally approved the P&A 
Agreement, and continued to have jurisdiction over it. 
Plaintiffs often raised their objection to the Commissioner's 
continued possession of the remaining assets of MFT&L. If their 
interpretation of the P&A Agreement was correct, the Court could 
have rejected the Commissioner's determinations as being 
"contrary to law", because they would have violated a contract 
(the P&A Agreement) which had been approved by the MFT&L Court. 
The MFT&L Court continually rejected the Plaintiffs' position, as 
should this Court. 
For each of the foregoing reasons, the State Defendants 
respectfully move the Court to deny the Plaintiffs' Rehearing 
Petition, or, in the alternative, to affirm the dismissal of 
Counts I and II by the Court below for any or all of the 
additional reasons cited by the State Defendants in their brief 
and at oral argument 
Dated this ML 
day of September, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
BtfYfcE fa. PETTEY A 
JJZ. 
Assistant Attorney General i  
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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
GARY S. HARRIS, et al., 
Plaintiff(s), 
vs. 
ELAINE B. WEIS, et al., 
Defendant(s). 
ORDER GRANTING RELIEF 
UNDER RULE 60(b)(1) 
Civil No. 87-C-0041-S 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
P l a i n t i f f s , Gary S. H a r r i s , e t a l . , have moved t h i s c o u r t f o r 
r e l i e f from t h e June 5 , 1989 Judgment of D i s m i s s a l t o t h e e x t e n t 
t h a t i t r e l a t e s t o t h e n i n t h c la im of the second amended compla int 
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T h i s c o u r t h a s a l r e a d y i n d i c a t e d i n i t s Order dated February 
2 7 , 1 9 9 0 , t h a t i t d i d n o t i n t e n d t o d i s m i s s t h a t c l a i m wi th 
p r e j u d i c e but t h a t d i s m i s s a l was only for l a c k of j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e r e l i e f r e q u e s t e d by p l a i n t i f f s i s hereby g r a n t e d . 
DATED t h i s 9 r day o f Jsi*A > 192£. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
GARY S. HARRIS, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ELAINE B. WEIS, et al., 
Defendants. ) Case No. 87-C-0041-S 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
This matter comes before the court on plaintiffs1 and 
defendants1 objections to the magistrate's report and recommenda-
tion advising the court to 1) dismiss plaintiffs1 second amended 
complaint, and 2) grant Rule 11 sanctions against the plaintiffs 
in the amount of $100 to each answering defendant. Also pending 
before this court are defendants1 motion to 1) strike plaintiffs1 
objections to the report and recommendation, 2) strike plaintiffs1 
3rd amended complaint, and 3) grant additional Rule 11 sanctions. 
Before addressing the objections, some background may be 
helpful. On November 25, 1987, this court adopted the prior 
reports and recommendations of the magistrate, dated July 17, 1987, 
July 23, 1987 and August 10, 1987, granting, in part, defendants1 
motions to dismiss. Resolution of these reports and recommenda-
tions was significantly delayed by conflicts between plaintiffs and 
their counsel. The court, however, in an abundance of caution, 
allowed plaintiffs until December 21, 1987 to amend the complaint 
to cure defects noted by the magistrate, stating, "All claims 
recommended for dismissal, which cannot be cured by filing an 
amended complaint, will be dismissed with prejudice." As indicated 
by the minute entry of November 20, 1987, and the ruling of 
November 25, 1987, the court took particular caution to insure 
plaintiffs were properly notified of its decision. 
On December 21, 1987, Robert M. McDonald, on plaintiffs1 
behalf, requested until December 31, 1987 to file a second amended 
complaint. The court granted the request. On January 4, 1988, Mr. 
McDonald again moved for an extension of time until January 15, 
1988. The court again accommodated. The second amended complaint 
was filed January 15, 1988 by Richard J. Leedy, who has been 
replaced by Mr. McDonald as plaintiffs1 counsel. Defendants were 
granted extensions of time and were allowed to file briefs in 
excess of page limitations to support their motions to dismiss the 
second amended complaint. Because the second amended complaint did 
not cure "glaring errors" in the first amended complaint, which the 
court had brought to plaintiffs1 attention, the magistrate 
recommends dismissal of the second amended complaint and Rule 11 




On May 20, 1988, defendants Johnson and Jarman objected to the 
report and recommendation for two reasons. First, it did not 
address all of the grounds for dismissal raised by Johnson and 
Jarman, including 
(1) There is no private right of action under 
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act; 
(2) Plaintiffs1 civil rights claims do not allege 
a constitutional violation and do not allege 
conspiracy with the requisite particularity; 
(3) Plaintiffs1 fraud claims fail to satisfy the 
particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and 
(4) Plaintiffs1 RICO and RICE claims fail to 
adequately allege the requisite elements of 
those alleged violations. 
Second, the amount awarded under Rule 11 ($100 per defendant) was 
allegedly insufficient to compensate for their fees. They request 
a sanction of $5,080. 
On May 23, 1988, plaintiffs, through new counsel Robert M. 
McDonald, objected to dismissal of the second amended complaint and 
sanctions for the following reasons: 
(a) [T]he basis giving rise to the recommendation 
arose by reason of the negligence of prior counsel who 
drafted the Second Amended Complaint and failed to 
correct the defects specifically enumerated by the 
magistrate; (b) a litigant with a meritorous (sic) claim 
should not be penalized by the inability of counsel to 
properly state his claim and comply with simple procedur-
al rules; (c) the Magistrate's recommendation is moot 
inasmuch as Plaintiffs have filed a Third Amended 
Complaint which they are permitted to do without leave 
of Court pursuant to Rule 15, F.R.C.P. inasmuch as no 
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responsive pleading has been filed; (c) the Third Amended 
Complaint (a copy of which is attached) and the Memoran-
dum filed with this objection demonstrates that Plain-
tiffs have meritorous (sic) claims and that the problems 
leading to the Magistrate's recommendation have been 
corrected and are not dispositive of Plaintiffs1 claims. 
On May 26, 1988, defendants Dobson and Van Winkle objected to 
the report and recommendation asserting that the Rule 11 sanctions 
should be increased to include all reasonable fees and costs 
incurred after the filing of the defective second amended com-
plaint. They request $3,284.00. 
On June 8, 1988, defendants Johnson and Jarman moved 1) to 
strike plaintiffs1 objection to the report and recommendation 
(together with the 3rd amended complaint), and 2) for further Rule 
11 sanctions. They assert the following: 
1. With regard to plaintiffs1 Objection to Report 
& Recommendation of the United States Magistrate, 
plaintiffs chose not to offer any opposition whatsoever 
to Johnson's and Jarmanfs Motion to Dismiss the Second 
Amended Complaint prior to the Magistrate's determination 
of that motion despite every opportunity to do so. The 
objections they now raise, having never been raised 
before the magistrate, should not be considered by the 
Court. 
2. With regard to plaintiffs1 Third Amended 
Complaint, plaintiffs have already used their one free 
amendment under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and therefore have no right to file the Third 
Amended Complaint absent leave of the Court. Further, 
plaintiffs' claims in this action, as stated in the 
Second Amended Complaint, have essentially been dismissed 
with prejudice and therefore plaintiffs have no right to 
amend their complaint without leave of the Court on that 
ground as well. 
4 
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3. Plaintiffs, and particularly their counsel, 
Robert M. McDonald, have filed their Third Amended 
Complaint and Objection to Report & Recommendation of the 
United States Magistrate with no basis in fact or in law 
for filing those pleadings. Therefore, under Rule 11 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants Johnson 
and Jarman should be awarded their reasonable attorneys1 
fees incurred in bringing this motion. 
On June 10, 198S, defendants Dobson and Van Winkle likewise 
filed a motion to strike. On that same day, state defendants' also 
joined in Johnson's and Jarman1s motion to strike. 
Considering the case history and the failure of plaintiffs to 
file a motion for leave of court to file a third amended complaint, 
the third amended complaint is not properly before the court and 
will not be considered. The court rejects plaintiffs1 contention 
that leave is not required because no responsive pleadings were 
filed to the second amended complaint. Plaintiffs9 Rule 15 
opportunity to amend without leave was clearly used when the first 
amended complaint was filed on February 12, 1987 without defen-
dants' consent and without leave of court. The court stretched the 
bounds of propriety first by allowing a second amended complaint 
after resolution of defendants' motions to dismiss was significant-
ly delayed due to failure of the plaintiffs to timely address the 
magistrate's reports and recommendations, and second by granting 
two subsequent motions to extend time to file an amended complaint. 
In this situation, the contention that a third amended complaint, 
5 
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submitted May 23, 1988, some five months after the courtfs final 
extended deadline, is allowed without leave of court and without 
a proper motion is frivolous at best. The court grants Rule 11 
sanctions in the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in 
moving to strike the third amended complaint, the amount of which 
will be determined upon further hearing. Defendants1 motions to 
strike the third amended complaint are granted. 
The court turns its attention to the second amended complaint 
and whether it cures the defective claims the magistrate previously 
recommended dismissing. If it does not, then, pursuant to the 
courtfs ruling of November 25, 1987, these claims will be dismissed 
with prejudice. Upon review of both the first amended complaint 
and the second, the court concludes that the defects were not 
curable or were not cured. The magistrates report and recommenda-
tion of July 17, 1987, recommended dismissal of the claims of 
plaintiffs Harris, Hansen, Nelson, Gordon, and MIT Mortgage 
Company, found in the first, second, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, 
eighth (as to its derivative claims), and eleventh claims of the 
first amended complaint. The July 17th report and recommendation 
also recommended dismissal of the fourth claim for failure to state 
a claim, in that no private right of action exists under fi 17 of 
the Securities Act of 1933. The eighth (as to claims for direct 
injury), ninth, and tenth claims were not recommended for dismis-
6 
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sal* The eighth claim was asserted against "all defendants11, the 
ninth against the State of Utah only# and tenth against defendants 
Weis, Sutton, Larsen, and Throndsen. 
The court notes that the numbering of claims in the second 
amended complaint corresponds to the numbering of claims in the 
first, with one exception. The ninth claim in the first amended 
complaint is abandoned in the second and therefore claim ten in the 
first amended complaint corresponds to claim nine in the second. 
The only claim which follows the ninth claim in the second amended 
complaint is not numbered but corresponds to claim eleven of the 
first amended complaint. 
The magistrate's report and recommendation of July 23, 1987 
recommended dismissal of all claims against the State of Utah and 
its officers in their official capacity. 
The magistrates report and recommendation of August 10, 1987 
recommended dismissal of the remaining claims found in the eighth 
claim (as to claims for direct injury) against the "non-state 
defendants'1 for failure to state a claim, i.e., failure to plead 
the elements of the claim with the requisite particularity. It 
also recommended dismissal of all claims of MFT Mortgage Company, 
since the latter could not assert derivative claims (not being a 
shareholder of any party) and asserted no claims for injury 
directly to itself. The issue of whether the eighth claim (as to 
7 
claims for direct injury) states a claim against the state defen-
dants in their individual capacities remains open. 
The claims of the first amended complaint which were not 
susceptible to curative amendment by plaintiffs Hansen, Nelson, 
Gordon, and MFT Mortgage Company and which have been recommended 
for dismissal under prior reports and recommendations adopted by 
this court are the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, 
seventh, eighth (as to derivative claims), ninth, and eleventh 
claims* The claims of the first amended complaint which were not 
susceptible to curative amendment by plaintiff Harris are the 
fourth and ninth claims. The claims susceptible to curative 
amendment by plaintiff Harris are the derivative claims found 
within the first, second, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and 
eleventh claims, but only upon condition that plaintiffs 1) make 
demand upon Citizens Bankshares, Thrift Holding Company, and 
Charter Thrift £ Loan to bring a derivative action on behalf of 
Thrift Holding Company and Charter Thrift & Loan; 2) obtain 
permission of the state court supervising the receivership of 
Thrift Holding Company and Charter Thrift & Loan to bring suit on 
their behalf or against the receiver; 3) verify the second amended 
complaint; and 4) join Citizens Bankshares, Thrift Holding Company, 
and Charter Thrift & Loan as parties. The eighth claim (as to 
direct injury claims) remains in place against the state defendants 
8 
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in their individual capacities; against the non-state defendants 
it is recommended for dismissal absent amendment sufficient to cure 
its pleading deficiencies. The remaining claim not recommended for 
dismissal is the tenth claim, which is plaintiff Harris1 claim for 
defamation against defendants Weis, Sutton, Larsen, and Throndsen. 
The state defendants are: Elaine B. Weis, George R. Sutton, 
State of Utah, Darwin M. Larsen, R. Scott Baker, Mary Amidan, and 
Robert S. Gale. 
The non-state defendants are Stanley A. Anderson, Robert B. 
Beckstead, Mirvin D. Borthick, Dean G. Christensen, Richard A. 
Christenson, W. Harold Dobson, John A. Firmage, Jr., Larry E. 
Grant, Larry R. Hendricks, Robert L. Howe, Carl A. Hulbert, Edward 
M. Jamison, John C. Jarman, Russell B. Jex, Charles E. Johnson, 
Irene Jorgensen, Fred S. Kohlruss, Ronald C. Lease, T. Kay Lyman, 
Paul A. Miller, Richard D. Paul, Richard M. Robinson, Ed H. 
Throndsen, Richard A. Van Winkle, Dr. Terry Warner, First Security 
Corporation, a corporation, First Security Financial, and Does 1 
through 40. The second amended complaint adds Thrift Holding 
Company and Charter Thrift and Loan. 
Plaintiffs do not contend that the second amended complaint 
cures the defects in the first. To the contrary, plaintiffs1 
counsel "acknowledges that the Second Amended Complaint is defi-
cient in many respects and unresponsive to the directives of the 
9 
magistrate." (Plaintiffs1 Memorandum in Support of Objection to 
Magistrates Report and Recommendation, March 23, 1988, p.4). 
Plaintiffs1 counsel relies instead on a subsequent submission on 
May 23, 1988 of a third amended complaint which he asserts he can 
file vithout leave of court despite 1) the court's ruling of 
November 25, 1987 allowing plaintiffs until December 21, 1987 to 
file an amended complaint and requiring that plaintiffs be notified 
of the court's decision and 2) plaintiffs' counsel's own motions 
for extension of time to file the second amended complaint. The 
court therefore concludes that the second amended complaint was 
not well grounded in fact or warranted by existing law. According-
ly, the court grants defendants' motion for Rule 11 sanctions 
against the plaintiffs in the amount of the reasonable expenses 
incurred because of the filing of the defective second amended 
complaint, including a reasonable attorney's fee, to be determined 
upon further hearing. 
Upon the basis of the foregoing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the first, second, third, fourth, 
fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth (as to derivative claims and as to 
direct claims against the non-state defendants), ninth, and 
eleventh claims of the amended complaint, together with the 
corresponding claims of the second amended complaint, are dismissed 
on the merits and with prejudice. 
10 
IV • 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a l l claims against the State of 
Utah and i t s off icers in their o f f i c ia l capacities are dismissed 
on the merits and with prejudice. 
This order does not dismiss the eighth, claim of the amended 
complaint as replaced by the eighth claim of the second amended 
complaint, insofar as i t asserts a claim against the state defen-
dants in their individual capacit ies , nor does i t dismiss the tenth 
claim of the amended complaint as replaced by the ninth claim of 
the second amended complaint. Aside from these exceptions, a l l 
claims and th i s entire action are hereby dismissed on the merits 
and with prejudice as to a l l defendants. Defendants are ent i t led 
to the ir cos t s . 
th i s J** day of M^tZJL^ . 198J1. 
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ADDENDUM 4 
P I L . «w UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT, DISTRICT OF UTAH 
APR 2 i 1989 
MARKUS B. Z.WMER, CLERK 
BY <&L 
DE^L'TY CL£PK 
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DISTRICT 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
GARY S. HARRIS, et al., 
R U L I N G 
Plaintiff(s), 
vs. 
ELAINE B. WEIS, et al., 
Defendant(s). 
Case No. 87-C-0041-S 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On March 31, 1989, several defendants moved for entry of 
judgment dismissing all claims with prejudice in the above entitled 
matter. The time for responding to defendants' motion having now 
expired without any opposition having been filed, and it appearing 
to the court that all claims in the case have now been dismissed, 
defendants1 motion is granted. The court requests the movants to 
coordinate with other defense counsel to prepare an appropriate 
final order and judgment for the court's signature and to circulate 
the same for approval as to form pursuant to Rule 13 (e) of the 
Civil Rules of Practice. 
DATED this i/^day of C^J 198JL. 
4/25/89:dp 
Copies trailed to counsel 
listed on attached page 
BY THE COURT: 
A A < ^ Y S^/er 
DAVID SAM 
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 
_<\5jAa*3 
ADDENDUM 5 
Richard J. Leedy 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
230 East 300 South, Suite 1010 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH' 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
GARY S. HARRIS; GARY S. HARRIS, 
acting derivatively for and on 
on behalf of THRIFT HOLDING 
COMPANY, a corporation and CHARTER 
THRIFT & LOAN, a corporation; MFT 
MORTGAGE COMPANY, a corporation; 
FRANK A, NELSON Jr, JIM P. HANSEN, 
and RODNEY F. GORDON, acting 
individually and derivatively for 
and on behalf of MURRAY FIRST 
THRIFT & LOAN CO., a corporation, 




ELAINE B. WEIS, individually; 
ELAINE B. WEIS, in her capacity as 
Commissioner of the Department of 
Financial Institutions of the State 
of Utah; GEORGE R. SUTTON; GEORGE 
R. SUTTON, in his capacity as 
Assistant Commissioner of the 
Department of Financial Institu-
tions of the State of Utah; THE 
STATE OF UTAH; DARWIN M. LARSEN; 
R. SCOTT BAKER; R. SCOTT BAKER, in 
his capacity as a duly authorized 
representative and agent of the 
Utah Commissioners of Financial 
Institutions; MARY AMIDAN; MARY 
AMIDAN, in her capacity as a duly 
authorized representative and agent 
of the Utah Commissioner of 
Financial Institutions; ROBERT S. 
GALE; ROBERT S. GALE, in his cap-
acity as a duly authorized repre-
sentative and agent of the Utah 
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Civil No. C 87-0041 S 
003 ^OM? 
Commissioner of Financial Institu-
tions; STANLEY A. ANDERSON; ROBERT 
B. BECKSTEAD; MIRVIN D. BORTHICK; 
DEAN G. CHRISTENSEN; RICHARD A. 
CHRISTENSON; W. HAROLD DOBSON; 
JOHN A. FIRMAGE, JR.; LARRY E. 
GRANT; LARRY R. HENDRICKS; ROBERT 
L. HOWE; CARL A. HULBERT; EDWARD M. 
JAMISON; JOHN C. JARMAN; RUSSELL B. 
JEX; CHARLES E. JOHNSON; IRENE 
JORGENSEN; FRED S. KOHLRUSS; RONALD 
C. LEASE; T. KAY LYMAN; PAUL A. 
MILLER; RICHARD D. PAUL; RICHARD M. 
ROBINSON; ED H. THRONDSEN; RICHARD 
A. VAN WINKLE; DR. TERRY WARNER; 
FIRST SECURITY CORPORATION, a corp-
oration; FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, 
a corporation; THRIFT HOLDING 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
currently in control of an 
adversarial receiver; CHARTER 
THRIFT AND LOAN COMPANY, a corpora-
tion currently in the hands of an 
adversarial receiver in possession; 




JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. The jurisdiction of this court is invoked under Title 
28 U.S.C. section 1331 et seq. as to the First through Fifth 
Claims, and the Eighth Claim; and under Title 18 U.S.C. sections 
1961-1964 as to the Sixth and Seventh Claims. This court's 
jurisdiction over the Ninth and Tenth Claims is pendent to its 
jurisdiction over the federal claims for relief. 
2. Venue as to each defendant is laid in the central 
division of this judicial district under 28 U.S.C. section 1391 
2 
00313 
(b) and (c), and 1393, and 18 U.S.C. section 1965 in that (a) one 
or more of the defendants resides, maintains an office, transacts 
business, has an agent, or is found within this district and 
division, (b) plaintiffs' claims arose in this district and 
division, (c) the offer and sale of securities herein complained 
of took place in this district and division, (d) the violations 
of securities law set forth in this complaint took place in this 
district and division, (e) the defendants made, sent, telephoned 
or caused to be made, sent or telephoned into this district and 
division false and misleading statements in connection with the 
sale of securities. Through such misrepresentations and related 
nondisclosures plaintiffs were induced to agree to, and did, pay 




3. Plaintiff Gary S. Harris ("Harris") is a resident of 
Weber County, Utah. Harris was a major shareholder, director, 
officer and managing agent of Thrift Holding Company, ("Thrift 
Holding") and its subsidiary, Charter Thrift & Loan ("Charter") 
both of which are Utah corporations. Harris brings this action 
individually on his own behalf and derivatively on behalf of 
Thrift Holding and Charter. Defendant Weis, acting under color 
of state law, seized Thrift Holding Company and Charter on or 
about June 30, 1986, and thereupon usurped the functions of the 
shareholders, directors, officers, and principal managing agents 
3 
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of Thrift Holding and Charter and has at all time since June 30, 
1986 exercised exclusive management control over all operations 
of Thrift Holding and Charter, claiming that she in doing so she 
has acted as "receiver in possession." Any demand served upon 
Weis to initiate this action against herself, the State of Utah 
or the other defendants who were her co-conspirators, including 
directors of Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation of Utah 
("ILGC") a Utah corporation, would be futile, and a useless act. 
The making of any such demand prior to initiating this action is 
therefore excused. 
4* Plaintiffs Frank A. Nelson, Jr. ("Nelson"), Jim P. 
Hansen ("Hansen"), and Rodney F. Gordon ("Gordon") are residents 
of Salt Lake County, Utah; directly and indirectly they are the 
principal shareholders of the Murray First entities and infused 
more than $11,000,000 of their personal assets into Murray First 
Thrift & Loan pursuant to an agreement dated July 17, 1981, to 
which all defendants were or became parties. 
5. Plaintiff Murray First Thrift & Loan Co. ("Murray 
First") is a Utah corporation, wholly owned by plaintiff MFT 
Financial, Inc. ("MFT Financial"). The majority of the stock of 
MFT Financial is owned by Nelson, Hansen and Gordon. MFT 
Mortgage Company, a Utah corporation, is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of MFT Financial. These three corporate entities and 
Nelson, Hansen and Gordon are collectively referred to herein as 
the "Murray First entities." 
4 
6. Nelson, Hansen and Gordon bring this action 
individually, each on his own behalf, and derivatively on behalf 
of Murray First Thrift & Loan, MFT Financial, and MFT Mortgage 
Company. Defendant Weis, acting under color of state law, seized 
Murray First on July 22, 1982 and MFT Financial on or about 
August 26, 1982. Defendant Weis has usurped the functions of the 
shareholders, directors, officers and principal managing agents 
of the Murray First entities and has at all times since usurping 
said functions exercised exclusive management control over all 
operations of Murray First and MFT Financial, claiming that she 
in doing so she has acted as "receiver in possession by 
deliberately failing to file tax returns and other documents 
requisite to maintaining Murray First entities in good standing. 
Any demand served upon Weis to initiate this action against 
herself, the State of Utah or the other defendants who were her 
co-conspirators, including directors of Industrial Loan Guaranty 
Corporation of Utah ("ILGC") a Utah corporation, would be futile, 
and a useless act. The making of any such demand prior to 
initiating this action is therefore excused. 
7. Defendant Elaine B. Weis ("Weis") is the Commissioner 
of Financial Institutions for the State of Utah. 
8. Defendant George R. Sutton ("Sutton") is the Deputy 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions for the State of Utah. 
Weis and Sutton are collectively referred to herein as the 
"Public Servant" defendants. 
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9. Defendants Darwin S. Larsen ("Larsen"), Scott Baker 
("Baker"), Mary Amidan ("Amidan") and Robert Gale ("Gale") are 
residents of Weber County, and acted as the representatives and 
agents of defendant Weis in conducting the affairs of Charter 
Thrift and Loan; such agency and employment of Baker, Amidan and 
Gale was formally acknowledged by Weis on or about July 31, 1986; 
plaintiff Harris is informed and believes, and on that ground 
alleges that a de facto agency existed for many months before 
July 31, 1986. Larsen, Baker, Amidan and Gale are each sued 
individually and as agents of Weis and the other defendants. 
10. Stanley A. Anderson, Robert B. Beckstead, Mirvin D. 
Borthick, Dean G. Christensen, Richard A. Christenson; W. Harold 
Dobson, John A. Firmage, Jr., Larry E. Grant, Larry R. Hendricks, 
Robert L. Howe, Carl A. Hulbert, Edward M. Jamison, John C. 
Jarman, Russell B. Jex, Charles E. Johnson, Irene Jorgensen, Fred 
S. Kohlruss, Ronald C. Lease, T. Kay Lyman, Paul A. Miller, 
Richard D. Paul, Richard M. Robinson, Ed H. Throndsen, Richard A. 
Van Winkle, and Dr. Terry Warner served at various times as the 
directors of ILGC from March 22, 1982 to July 31, 1986. They are 
collectively referred to herein as the tfILGC directors." Each of 
the defendants named in this paragraph is a resident of this 
judicial district as set forth in attached Exhibit 1. 
11. Defendant First Security Financial Corporation is a 
Utah corporation, an industrial loan corporation with thrift 
powers, doing business in Salt Lake City as a thrift institution. 
6 
12. The true names of defendants Does 1 through 40 are 
presently unknown to plaintiffs, who will amend this complaint to 
allege their true names, when they become known. Defendants 
First Security Financial and Does 1 through 20 are each thrift or 
banking institutions who at relevant times owned one or more 
industrial loan corporation with thrift powers doing business in 
this judicial district as a thrift institution. One or more 
employees of each defendant named in this paragraph served as a 
director of ILGC during the relevant time period. The defendants 
named in this paragraph are collectively referred to herein as 
the "private party" defendants. 
13. Does 21 through 40 are bonding companies and sureties 
for the State of Utah. The Utah State Auditor has refused to 
identify Does 21 through 40 to plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs 
will amend this complaint when their identities have been 
ascertained. 
14. Defendant State of Utah is one of the United States, 
and was admitted to statehood in 1896. 
15. The ILGC directors, Weis, Sutton, Larsen, Baker, 
Amidan, Gale and the private party defendants were the agents of 
each other, and the State of Utah, in committing the wrongful 
acts alleged, and each acted in the course and scope of such 
agency in committing the misrepresentations and failures to 
disclose which are alleged herein. The ILGC directors, Weis, 
Sutton, Larsen, Baker, Amidan, Gale, the private party 
defendants, and the State of Utah ratified each of the acts of 
7 
the other defendants committed pursuant to such agency and 
employment. 
16. Weis, Sutton, Larsen, Baker, Amidan, Gale and each of 
the ILGC directors conspired and agreed to commit the wrongful 
acts alleged herein, and the overt acts alleged were committed in 
furtherance of their conspiracy. 
17. Defendants Thrift Holding Company and Charter Thrift & 
Loan Company are defendants because they are in the antagonistic 
hands of a defendant receiver and/or receiver in possession 
and/or trustee however characterized who willfully refused, 
declined and neglected to bring this action on behalf of said 
parties. 
18. ILGC is a Utah non-profit corporation, organized under 
the laws of the State of Utah, organized with the stated purpose 
"to guarantee full payment of account obligations of members up 
to ten thousand dollars for each account," later increased to 
fifteen thousand dollars. Neither the enabling legislation, nor 
the Articles of Incorporation grant general corporate powers to 
the ILGC. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that 
ground allege that the ILGC lacked authority to issue securities. 
V. 
A\\ )) ±9. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the allegations of 
Lv I ^- * ^Against Defendants Weis, Sutton, and 
T i l O / ^ ^ 1/A i,~"^ FIRST CLAIM 
ft7 Mtn^ 
^ r v 
1 X 1 1
 the ILGC directors) 
this complaint into this claim. 
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20. On or about July 17, 1981 the Defendant State of Utah, 
through its Department of Financial Institutions and in 
conspiracy and consort with the other defendants, proposed an 
agreement in writing which agreement was affirmed and accepted by 
Plaintiffs Hansen, Nelson and Gordon and others. 
21. Pursuant to this agreement, Plaintiffs Hansen, Nelson 
and Gordon were to become owners of controlling stock interests 
(not less than 80%) in Murray First Thrift & Loan, MFT Financial, 
MFT Mortgage and MFT Leasing Company by investing their personal 
cash, certain personal assets and assets of associates into said 
companies capital account in an amount of approximately 
$11,100,000. Other corporate affiliates of those companies were 
to be dissolved including Reading Holding Company, Irving 
Financial Corporation, and other "affiliates and related 
entities." A time frame was set forth to accomplish 
reorganization and the issuance of shares in MFT Financial for 
the infusion of capital which was subsequently extended by mutual 
agreement. The capital was infused by Plaintiffs for stock 
interest provided in the form and in the manner demanded by 
defendants. However, on July 22, 1982, prior to final 
reorganization and issuance of shares, Murray First Thrift was 
seized by the State of Utah and such seizure included the capital 
infused by Plaintiffs for which shares had not yet been issued 
pending completion of reorganization. 
22. On October 6, 1982, by order of the Third District 
Court the ILGC was appointed as agent for the State of Utah to 
9 
negotiate a sale of assets of Murray First Thrift 6 Loan to 
several qualified purchasers together with the Plaintiffs who 
were designated as owners and owners' representatives acting for 
and in behalf of Murray First Thrift & Loan. 
23. On November 3, 1982 by subsequent order of the Third 
District Court, Defendant Weis was prohibited from interfering or 
even participating in negotiations for the sale of the banking 
function of Murray First Thrift & Loan. Her role was limited to 
submission of any agreement reached between Plaintiffs Hansen, 
Nelson, and Gordon and ILGC and First Security Bank to the 
Federal Reserve Board with her recommendation for approval. 
24. On November 5, 1982 a series of agreements between 
ILGC, First Security and the Plaintiffs were executed and a 
purchase and assumption agreement agreed to involving all of the 
parties hereto. As part and parcel of said agreement the capital 
invested by Hansen, Nelson and Gordon set forth in paragraph 19 
above, was "retained" for their benefit and use and for the 
benefit and use of the Murray First entities and by specific 
terms of the agreements were to be conveyed to an independent 
trust to be managed by Hansen and Gordon pending approval of the 
purchase and assumption agreement by the Federal Reserve Board. 
25. Commencing on or about November 15, 1982 and ending in 
June 1985, ILGC issued securities in the form of (1) promissory 
notes pursuant to the purchase and assumption agreement executed 
by the Murray First entities with a total face value of 
$7,000,000 issued November 15, 1982; and an additional $3,000,000 
10 
issued over a period of time ending in December 1986; and (2) 
promissory notes issued to other thrift investors in the total 
face amount of at least $13,000,000 which plaintiffs are informed 
and believe were issued at various times between November 1984 
and June 1986. In all cases the promissory notes were secured by 
or offset against the Plaintiffs Hansen, Gordon and Nelson assets 
infused into Murray First Thrift according to the July 17, 1981 
uncompleted agreement. 1. On or about November 1984 Charter 
was induced by Weis to purchase $2,400,000 worth of ILGC 
promissory notes from ILGC in connection with Charter's 
acquisition of Continental Thrift & Loan. Weis had seized 
Continental Thrift on the basis that its capital was impaired. 
Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on such grounds allege 
that ILGC notes, in the total face amount of not less than 
$23,000,000 were issued by the ILGC directors as obligations of 
ILGC, at the behest of Weis, and were purchased by other thrift 
institution investors, in addition to the $2,400,000 sold to 
Charter. 
26. On November 15, 1982 Murray First Thrift, MFT 
Financial, and MFT Mortgage, Rodney F. Gordon, Frank A. Nelson, 
and Jim P. Hansen entered into a purchase and assumption 
agreement with ILGC, First Security Financial, and Weis. Gordon, 
Hansen and Nelson retained assets in Murray First Thrift & Loan 
together with the other interests of the Murray First entities 
specifically acknowledged. In addition, consideration totaling 
$10,000,000 to ILGC for ILGC promissory notes in the amount of 
11 
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$10,000,000 were issued to First Security Financial. As a result 
of the purchase and assumption agreement, $7,000,000 in ILGC 
notes were issued to First Security Financial on or about 
November 15, 1982 and $3,000,000 in notes were issued to First 
Security Financial by December 31, 1986. All of the 
consideration for $10,000,000 in ILGC promissory notes issued to 
First Security Financial were paid by the capital assets which 
were the property of Hansen, Nelson and Gordon and the Murray 
First Thrift entities. 
27• Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that ground 
allege, that ILGC directors issued and Weis induced sales of ILGC 
notes to the following entities in the amounts set forth: 
(a) $3,000,000 to Commerce Financial Thrift; 
(b) $2,000,000 to Copper State Thrift; 
(c) $4,000,000 to Interlake Thrift; 
(d) $2,000,000 to Western Heritage Thrift. 
28. The securities purchased by plaintiffs as well as 
similar securities purchased by other investors were issued by 
ILGC for the following purposes: (i) to induce the Murray First 
entities to enter into the purchase and assumption agreement, and 
(ii) to replace the capital which Plaintiffs Hansen, Gordon and 
Nelson had infused pursuant to the July 17, 1981 agreement, and 
(iii) to induce Charter to acquire Continental Thrift; plaintiffs 
are informed and believe that (iv) ILGC promissory notes in the 
face amount of $3,000,000 were sold on or about February 17, 1984 
to "Commerce Financial Thrift by Weis to induce Commerce to 
12 
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acquire Cottonwood Thrift and Loan, which had been seized by Weis 
on the grounds that its capital was impaired; (v) plaintiffs are 
further informed and believe that ILGC promissory notes in the 
face amount of $2,000,000 were sold in December 1984 to Kent 
Brown and W. Hendricks by Weis to induce Hendricks and Brown to 
acquire Western Heritage Thrift and Loan, which had been seized 
by Weis on the grounds that its capital was impaired; (vi) ILGC 
promissory notes in the face amount of $2,000,000 were sold (at 
dates unknown to plaintiffs,) to Copper State Thrift by Weis to 
induce Copper State Thrift to acquire American Fidelity Thrift 
and Loan, which had been seized by Weis on the grounds that its 
capital was impaired; (vii) $4,000,000 in ILGC promissory notes 
were sold to Freedom Savings and Loan in connection with its 
acquisition of Interlake Thrift which had been seized by Weis on 
the grounds that its capital was impaired. 
29. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that the promissory 
notes were issued by ILGC, and sold by Weis, in part to evade 
ILGC's obligations to depositors of Cottonwood Thrift, American 
Fidelity Thrift, Continental Thrift, Western Heritage Thrift and 
Interlake Thrift. 
30. The securities issued by ILGC and sold by Weis to the 
Murray First entities and Charter Thrift were securities within 
the meaning of Section 2 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 
Section 77b(l) and Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. section 78c(a)(10). 
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31. Said securities were offered and sold to Hansen, Nelson 
and Gordon through the Murray First entities and Charter by use 
of instrumentalities of transportation and telephone and wire 
communications in interstate commerce and the mail, including but 
not limited to interstate telephone calls from Weis to Hansen, 
soliciting the sale of ILGC notes in which she made fraudulent 
misrepresentations alleged herein, and a telephone conference 
call from Weis in Utah to Hansen in Idaho and to Mendell 
Borthwick in Hawaii, wherein Weis stated that Honolulu Federal 
Savings and Loan (who had earlier agreed in principal to acquire 
Murray First Thrift and Loan by replacing the assets invested 
pursuant to the July 17, 1981 agreement) to acquire Murray First 
Thrift & Loan or any of its assets it would be required to 
purchase ILGC securities, and letters more fully described below. 
32. In connection with the offering and sale of said 
securities defendant Weis acted as an underwriter within the 
meaning of Section 2(11) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 
section 77b(ll). Weis was an active participant in the offering 
and sale in that, among other things, plaintiffs are informed and 
believe that: (i) Weis systematically solicited investors, 
including Charter, W. Hendricks, Kent Brown, Freedom Savings & 
Loan, and Copper State Thrift, among others, to purchase the 
notes issued by ILGC; (ii) Weis was and held herself out to be 
ILGC's advisor and the exclusive agent for placement of these 
securities; (iii) acceptances were communicated to Weis and the 
terms of purchase were negotiated by Weis in each instance; (iv) 
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the directions, representations, warranties and recommendations 
made by Weis were the significant factor in inducing the Murray 
First entities to pay for the notes issued to First Security 
Financial, and in inducing Harris to make the investment decision 
to acquire the ILGC securities in the name of Charter, and but 
for her representations and directions the Murray First entities 
would not have entered into the purchase and assumption agreement 
nor would plaintiffs have parted with any consideration for ILGC 
notes. 
33. But for the directions, representations, warranties and 
recommendations of defendant Weis, Charter would not have 
acquired Continental Thrift, and Harris would not have made the 
investment decision which caused Charter to purchase ILGC notes 
in the amount of $2,400,000. 
VI. 
j SECOND CLAIM 
,/U'l (Against Defendant Weis, Sutton, the ILGC Directors J)/r 
*\J" and the Private Party defendants under 
\J* Section 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act) 
34. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the allegations of 
this complaint into this claim. 
35. In making such offers and sales, Weis and the ILGC 
director defendants made untrue statements of material fact, and 
omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the 
statements, in light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading to the Murray First entities and to Charter 
15 
as described below. 
36. In connection with each sale, Weis and the ILGC 
directors represented to plaintiffs, among other things: 
(a) That ILGC had obligated, and would obligate 
itself to pay Charter and First Security Financial the 
sums stated and to perform other obligations according 
to the terms stated in the ILGC promissory notes; 
(b) That the securities, and specifically the 
dollar amounts shown on the face of the notes, were 
fully backed by the credit of ILGC; 
(c) In the case of Murray First entities, that 
Weis and ILGC could and would fully perform under the 
terms of the purchase and assumption agreement and 
return the capital to Hansen, Nelson and Gordon infused 
through the July 17, 1981 agreement. 
(d) In the case of Charter, the defendants 
represented to Gary Harris that the ILGC notes would be 
accepted by the federal regulators as capital assets 
for the purpose of determining the liquidity of Charter 
required by federal law and Federal Reserve 
regulations. 
37. These representations were untrue, among other reasons, 
because: 
(a) Neither Weis nor the ILGC directors had the 
ability to pay any holder of the ILGC promissory notes 
pursuant to the terms of the notes executed by the 
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ILGC, nor did Weis or ILGC otherwise have the ability 
to otherwise perform their obligations thereunder, 
because ILGC was insolvent at the time the notes were 
issued; 
(b) Neither Weis nor the ILGC directors had any 
means in reality of raising the required funds on 
behalf of ILGC sufficient to enable ILGC to pay the 
notes according to their terms; 
(c) Weis and the ILGC directors had been informed 
by the FDIC that the ILGC notes were unacceptable to 
the federal regulators, and would not be considered by 
the FDIC in determining the liquidity of any Utah 
thrift institution. 
38. In making the offers and sales, Weis and the ILGC 
directors induced, forced, and otherwise manipulated Hansen, 
Nelson and Gordon and the Murray entities, Harris, Charter and 
other investors to pay consideration for said securities and 
representations and warranties including those set forth above 
and representations and warranties and terms of the purchase and 
assumption agreement and "mutual release" supplement thereto, 
that omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make 
such representations not misleading, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made. In this connection, 
neither Weis nor the ILGC directors ever disclosed to Plaintiffs 
in connection with any sale of ILGC notes, any of the following: 
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(a) That ILGC was insolvent; 
(b) Neither Weis nor the ILGC directors had any 
intention of paying Charter, First Security, or any 
other holder of the ILGC promissory notes pursuant to 
the terms of the notes executed by the ILGC or of 
otherwise performing their obligations thereunder, 
because ILGC was insolvent at the time the notes were 
issued, and in truth and in fact intended to pay and 
did pay off notes with the Hansen, Nelson and Gordon 
assets. 
(c) Weis had no intention of fulfilling her 
obligation and exercising her authority to require the 
members of the ILGC to make pro rata contributions to 
pay the notes when they became due, in the event ILGC 
was unable to pay them; 
(d) Weis had no intention of fulfilling her 
obligation and exercising her authority to increase the 
capital of ILGC by assessments levied against its 
members. 
(e) Weis and the ILGC directors had no intention 
of performing the contractual obligations assumed by 
Weis and the ILGC under the purchase and assumption 
agreement with the Murray entities and the July 17, 
1981 agreement to which Hansen, Nelson and Gordon were 
signatories and sole investors of the capital assets. 
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(f) Weis and the ILGC directors knew that the 
ILGC promissory notes were unacceptable to the federal 
regulators, and would not be considered by the FDIC in 
determining the liquidity of any Utah thrift 
institution. 
39. No later than January 1, 1983 and long before the sale 
to Charter, Weis and the ILGC directors knew, but did not 
disclose to Charter or Gary Harris, that a massive and systematic 
fraud on investors had already been committed in the sale of ILGC 
promissory notes. 
40. To the extent that the ILGC directors did not actually 
know some or any of the facts set forth in the foregoing 
paragraphs, or did not know the falsity of some or any of the 
fraudulent representations, at the time of the solicitations and 
sales to Plaintiffs, said defendants in the exercise of 
reasonable care, should have known of said facts or said falsity. 
41. At all material times, plaintiffs ,were not aware that 
the defendants1 representations to them were untrue nor were they 
aware of the misleading character of Weis1 solicitations. In 
making their investments in ILGC securities the plaintiffs were 
also unaware of the material matters not disclosed by Weis and 
the ILGC directors. 
42. Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 
15 U.S.C. section 77-1(2), Weis and the ILGC directors are 
jointly and severally liable to repay the consideration paid by 
the Murray First entities and Charter with interest, or to pay 
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damages. Plaintiffs stand ready, willing and able to take all 
actions necessary to rescind the transactions wherein the 
securities were purchased including both the July 17, 1981 
agreement for the purchase of controlling interest in MFT by the 
investment of $11,000,000 and the purchase and assumption 
agreement by all parties by which those assets invested would be 
retained and returned after Federal Reserve Board approval. 
43. Plaintiffs did not discover, and through the exercise 
of reasonable diligence, could not have discovered that 
defendants1 representations and omissions, as described above, 
were false and misleading, until at least July 31, 1986. 
44. All of the defendants knowingly aided and abetted the 
violations of Section 12(2) set forth in this count. 
45. All of the defendants knowingly conspired and agreed to 
perform the acts which constitute the violations set forth in 
this count, and performed acts in furtherance of said conspiracy. 
46. All of the defendants knowingly conspired and agreed to 
conceal the acts of omission which constitute the violations set 




f\y (Against Defendant Weis, Sutton, the ILGC Directors 
and the Private Party defendants under 
Section 10 of the 1933 Securities Act, and Rule 10b~5) 
47. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the allegations of 
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this complaint into this claim. 
48. The conduct of the defendants as alleged above 
constituted a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud the 
plaintiffs. 
49. Defendants, directly or indirectly, by the use of means 
or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or the mails, 
employed a device, scheme or artifice to defraud plaintiffs, made 
untrue statements of material facts and omitted to state material 
facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, and 
engaged in acts, practices, and courses of business which 
operated as a fraud and deceit upon plaintiffs, all in connection 
with the purchase or sale of securities, and all in violation of 
Section 10 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. section 78-j 
and rule 10b-5. 
50. Defendants made such misrepresentations or omissions 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, intending that 
plaintiffs would rely thereon. 
51. Plaintiffs reasonably relied on said misrepresenta-
tions, omissions, and other violation of Section 10 and Rule 
10b-5, and were damaged and injured thereby. 
52. All of the defendants knowingly aided and abetted the 
violations of Section 10 and Rule 10b-5 set forth in this count. 
53. All of the defendants knowingly conspired and agreed to 
perform the acts which constitute the violations of Section 10 
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and Rule 10b-5 set forth in this count, and performed acts in 
furtherance of said conspiracy. 
54. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover from defendants the 
consideration paid for said securities, or in the alternative, to 
recover damages from defendants, including punitive damages. 
\ l tfi*" FOURTH CLAIM 
[y* (Against Defendant Weis and the ILGC Director Defendants 
under Section 17 of the 1933 Securities Act) 
55. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the allegations of 
this complaint into this claim. 
56. Weis and the ILGC directors misrepresented the facts as 
set forth herein, and refused to disclose said material 
considerations with the intent to induce Charter and the Murray 
First entities to purchase said securities. Each of said 
defendants knew of the untruth of their representations and were 
aware of the nondisclosed information set forth above. 
Plaintiffs were unaware that said representations were false and 
misleading, and justifiably relied on said misrepresentations and 
nondisclosures in purchasing said securities. 
57. To the extent that any of the ILGC directors did not 
know of the falsity of said misrepresentations or omissions at 
the time of each offer and sale, each was so unaware only because 
said defendant intentionally and willfully acted to be shielded 
from the truth by willfully refusing to conduct the thorough and 
immediate investigation reasonably required in the circumstances. 
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Such refusal was in willful and reckless disregard of said 
defendants1 responsibilities to ascertain and disclose to 
plaintiffs the truth of such misrepresentations and material 
omissions. Defendants1 duty to conduct such an investigation 
arises from the following, among other things: 
(a) Weis acted as the underwriter, and as a 
participant in effecting the sales of worthless notes 
to Charter and converting the capital assets of the 
plaintiffs and of the Murray First entities and others. 
Weis held herself out to plaintiffs as a skilled 
advisor who would not offer or recommend an issue 
without having thoroughly investigated the issue and 
without fully disclosing all material risks. Before 
and during Weis' solicitations to plaintiffs Weis had 
participated in the day to day operations of ILGC. As 
a result of this pre-existing relationship, and in 
light of Weis1 superior knowledge concerning ILGC, and 
the securities at issue, Weis knew that plaintiffs 
relied on the financial advice and investment 
recommendations of Weis and that plaintiffs believed 
Weis would not recommend ILGC securities as an 
investment to them without having thoroughly 
investigated the issue and without fully disclosing all 
material considerations to the plaintiffs, and in the 
case of personal plaintiffs, Hansen, Nelson and Gordon, 
relied on Weis to perform her fiduciary obligation to 
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them with respect to the retained assets described 
above. 
(b) The ILGC directors endorsed and authorized the 
issuance of the ILGC promissory note securities, and 
made direct and material representations and warranties 
to plaintiffs in the transactional documents, with the 
intent and purpose of convincing the plaintiffs that 
they were purchasing valid and binding ILGC 
obligations. The ILGC directors also knew that the 
plaintiffs reasonably believed in good faith that Weis 
was acting on ILGC's behalf and for ILGC's benefit in 
promoting said securities. 
58. Because of said misrepresentations and material 
omissions, Weis and the ILGC directors violated Section 17 of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. section 77q, in offering and 
selling said securities to plaintiffs. 
59. As a proximate result of such violations, plaintiffs 
Nelson, Hansen, Gordon, and the Murray First entities have been 
damaged in an amount of at least $2,400,000 and such other amount 
as may be proven at trial, which amounts plaintiffs are entitled 
to recover from said defendants, jointly and severally. 
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^ FIFTH CLAIM 
(Against Defendant Weis, Sutton, the ILGC Directors 
and the Private Party defendants under 
Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and Rule 10b-5) 
60. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the allegations of 
this complaint into this claim. 
61. Because of the misrepresentations and material 
omissions, Weis and the ILGC directors violated Section 10 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated 
thereto, in the sale of said securities to plaintiffs. 
62. As a proximate result of such violations, plaintiffs 
Nelson, Hansen, Gordon, and the Murray First entities have been 
damaged in an amount of at least $10,000,000 and such other 
amounts as may be proven at trial, which amounts plaintiffs are 
entitled to recover from said defendants, jointly and severally. 
63. As a proximate result of such violations, plaintiffs 
Harris and Charter have been damaged in an amount of at least 
$2,400,000 and such other amounts as may be proven at trial, 
which amounts plaintiffs are entitled to recover from said 
defendants, jointly and severally. 
X. 
P^ SIXTH CLAIM 
* tjv"^  (Against all Defendants under 18 U.S.C. section 1962(c)) 
}•> 64. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the allegations of 
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this complaint into this claim. 
65. At all material times the ILGC was an enterprise 
engaged in, and whose activities affected interstate commerce, in 
that, among other things, its deposit guaranty business and 
securities sales were conducted through interstate transactions. 
In addition, Weis, ILGC, the ILGC directors, and the private 
party defendants were an enterprise within the meaning of 18 
U.S.C. section 1961(4) and 1962(c) for the purpose of issuing, 
selling and defaulting on ILGC promissory notes. 
66. Weis, the ILGC directors and the private party 
defendants were each employed by or associated with said 
enterprise(s) in that, among other things: 
(a) Weis was associated with the enterprise(s) 
as she sold ILGC promissory notes to the plaintiffs and 
other thrift institutions by means of, among other 
things, written and oral communications and interstate 
telephone calls to the plaintiffs. 
(b) the ILGC directors were associated with the 
enterprise(s) through their approval and authorization 
of the issuance of worthless ILGC promissory notes, 
which they had the authority to control. 
(c) the private party defendants were associated with 
the enterprise(s) by virtue of their active 
participation as members in ILGC, in part through the 
employment of their employees as directors of ILGC. 
The private party defendants were also associated with 
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the enterprise(s) by participation in ILGCfs decision 
making process, specifically in the systematic and 
intentional undercapitalization of ILGC, which occurred 
through their control over the affairs of ILGC. 
67. Weis, the ILGC directors, and the private party 
defendants participated directly or indirectly in the conduct of 
the affairs of the enterprise(s) through a pattern of 
racketeering activity by each committing two or more acts 
involving securities fraud in violation of federal law, 
indictable mail or wire fraud, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
sections 1341, 1343, 1510, in furtherance of a systematic scheme 
to defraud the private party plaintiffs of their assets by and 
through Murray First entities, and in furtherance of another 
systematic scheme to defraud Gary Harris and Charter, and schemes 
to defraud other investors in the sale of various issues of ILGC 
promissory notes, and then default on the notes and force the 
purchaser thrift institutions into receivership. These acts 
included: 
(a) Weis, with intent to defraud plaintiffs and 
other investors and for the benefit of ILGC, 
systematically and willfully made and caused to be made 
repeated and knowingly false and misleading statements 
to plaintiffs and other investors and purposefully 
concealed from them material facts about ILGC and the 
promissory note securities for the purpose of inducing 
plaintiffs and other investors to purchase them, as set 
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forth in detail above. In furtherance of the 
fraudulent scheme, Weis, the ILGC directors and the 
private party defendants used interstate mails and 
wires, including repeated mailings and telephone calls 
from Utah to California, in connection with the Murray 
First Thrift Purchase and Assumption Agreement, and 
repeated telephone calls from Utah to Idaho to promote 
the scheme to defraud Gary Harris and Charter. 
(b) In connection with the scheme to defraud the 
Murray First entities, Weis, the ILGC directors and 
some of the private party defendants caused to be 
transported in interstate commerce forged, altered or 
counterfeited documents, including different fraudulent 
versions of the Murray First Purchase and Assumption 
Agreement, and the disposition of Hansen, Nelson and 
Gordon's retained assets therein. Four different 
fraudulently altered versions of the Murray First 
Purchase and Assumption Agreement were sent by mail by 
the defendants or their agents in furtherance of the 
defendants' scheme to defraud the Murray First 
entities: (i) one from Elmer Tucker, First Security 
Bank mailed to the Federal Reserve of San Francisco 
(Dec. 10, 1982); (ii) one from Don Allen, First 
Security Bank mailed to the Federal Reserve of San 
Francisco; (iii) one from Weis mailed to the Federal 
Reserve Board in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 9, 1982); 
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(iv) a later version mailed by First Security to the 
Federal Reserve Bank in San Francisco (April 1986). 
(c) Weis, the ILGC directors, and the private party 
defendants willfully endeavored to obstruct and prevent 
their employees and others not associated with the 
enterprise from communicating information to the 
criminal justice system or to the public concerning the 
mail and wire frauds alleged in this count, by 
misrepresentations, and by destroying or withholding 
records relating to these frauds. Furthermore, as 
described above, Weis and the ILGC directors committed 
violations involving federal securities fraud and Weis 
falsely accused the plaintiff Gary Harris of stealing 
funds from Charter, and absconding to Idaho with them. 
68. Each of the defendants knowingly aided and abetted each 
of the acts and omissions of the others. 
69. As a proximate result of the participation of Weis, the 
ILGC directors and the private party defendants in the conduct of 
said enterprise(s)f affairs through a pattern of racketeering 
activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1962(c) Gary Harris 
and Charter have suffered injury to their business and property 
and loss in the amount of at least $2,400,000 each, plus other 
damages to be proved at trial. 
70. As a proximate result of the participation of Weis, the 
ILGC directors and the private party defendants in the conduct of 
said enterprise(s)f affairs through a pattern of racketeering 
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activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1962(c) Nelson, Hansen 
and Gordon having been induced by defendant Borthick and 
subsequently by defendant Weis and members of the ILGC to 
purchase controlling interest in the Murray First entities by a 
series of agreements which the defendants had no intention of 
honoring. And the Murray First entities have suffered injury to 
their business and property and loss in the amount of at least 
$10,000,000 each, plus other damages to be proved at trial. 
71. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1964(c), plaintiffs are 
entitled to recover treble damages, costs and attorney's fees 
from defendants. 
• V: K^ XI. 
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 t 7-K SEVENTH CLAUSE 
\ AA(Against all Defendants u 
(^ 72. Plaintiffs hereby ii 
under 18 U.S.C. section 1962(c)) 
Q^ 72. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the allegations of 
this complaint into this claim. 
73. Weis, the ILGC directors, and the private party 
defendants conspired to conduct said enterprise(s) through the 
pattern of racketeering activity described above in the sale of 
ILGC securities to plaintiffs and other investors. 
74. As a proximate result of the participation of Weis, the 
ILGC directors and the private party defendants in the conduct of 
said enterprise(s)f affairs through a pattern of racketeering 
activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1962(c) Harris and 
Charter have suffered injury to their business and property and 
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loss in the amount of at least $2,400,000 each, plus other 
damages to be proved at trial. 
75. As a proximate result of the participation of Weis, the 
ILGC directors and the private party defendants in the conduct of 
said enterprise(s)f affairs through a pattern of racketeering 
activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1962(c) Nelson, 
Hansen, Gordon and the Murray First entities have suffered injury 
to their business and property and loss in the amount of at least 
$10,000,000 each, plus other damages to be proved at trial. 
76. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1964(c), plaintiffs are 




(Against all Defendants under 42 U.S.C. section 1983) 
77. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the allegations of 
this complaint into this claim. 
78. At times relevant to this claim Weis purported to act 
as the Commissioner of Financial Institutions; Borthick was her 
predecessor also purporting to act in the same capacity. Sutton 
was the Deputy Commissioner of Financial Institutions for the 
State of Utah. These defendants were responsible at various 
times for the supervision and control of others who acted as 
agents, employees and consultants to the State of Utah, while 
purporting to act on behalf of the State of Utah were in fact 
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acting for their own benefit and for the purposes of the other 
defendants and conspirators herein. 
79. In doing the acts alleged the public servant defendants 
purported to act under authority of state law but were in reality 
acting for themselves under color of law and under color of the 
statutes, regulations, customs and usages of the State of Utah, 
including the provisions of Title 7 of the Utah code, governing 
financial institutions. 
80. The ILGC directors, and the private party defendants 
combined and conspired with the public servant defendants to deny 
the plaintiffs their federal constitutional rights to due process 
and equal protection of the laws. The concerted action between 
the private party defendants, the ILGC directors and the public 
servant defendants constitutes state action for the purposes of 
42 U.S.C. section 1983. 
81. The public servant defendants and the ILGC director 
defendants deliberately misinterpreted and abused their power and 
authority to regulate plaintiffs' thrift institutions. 
Plaintiffs have been singled out for oppressive decisions; the 
public servant defendants have imposed unreasonable, arbitrary 
and capricious conditions on the individual plaintiffs and Murray 
First Thrift, and Charter including, but not limited to, inducing 
and requiring them to purchase stock in the Murray First entities 
and requiring them to purchase ILGC notes, and inducing private 
plaintiffs Hansen, Nelson, Gordon and Murray First Thrift & Loan, 
MFT Mortgage and MFT Financial through their president Jim P. 
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Hansen to enter into the purchase and assumption agreement and 
ancillary agreements dated November 5, 1982 and November 15, 
1982. Plaintiffs have been the victims of intentional and 
purposeful discrimination by the public servant and ILGC director 
defendants. State officials Weis, Borthick, Sutton and their 
agent Richard A. Christenson deliberately misinterpreted the 
powers of the Commissioner and ILGC and have purposely singled 
out the plaintiffs for such misinterpretations. Such unequal 
application of the law and regulations constitutes a denial of 
equal protection of the laws. 
82. Plaintiffs were deprived of their federal 
constitutional rights because they were selectively treated by 
the public servant defendants acting in concert with the ILGC 
directors, and the private party defendants. Unfair, 
discriminatory and burdensome conditions and requirements were 
imposed on plaintiffs which were not imposed on other similarly 
situated thrift institutions. More particularly, such conditions 
and requirements were not imposed on the private party defendants 
in the operation of their affiliated thrift institutions. 
83. The selective treatment of plaintiffs by the public 
servant defendants was based on impermissible considerations; 
namely, an intent to cover up the mismanagement and insolvency of 
ILGC by issuing notes and Net Worth Certificates and planned to 
plunder the assets of the private plaintiffs and of plaintiffs1 
corporations and to accord preferential treatment to the private 
party defendants and their affiliates. 
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84. The defendants acted with malicious intent to deprive 
plaintiffs of due process and equal protection of the laws, and 
the concerted acts of the defendants caused such deprivations to 
occur. The defendants1 concerted action under color of law has 
deprived plaintiffs of rights, privileges, and immunities secured 
to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States; 
particularly their rights not to be deprived of property without 
due process of law and just compensation, guaranteed by the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution; and their rights 
to the equal protection of the laws guaranteed under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
85. In addition to general damages, plaintiffs are entitled 
to punitive damages as may be proved. 
86. As the direct and proximate result of the acts of the 
defendants alleged above, plaintiffs have suffered out of pocket 
pecuniary losses and damages to their business and property, 
including the loss to the Murray First entities of not less than 
$13,000,000 in Murray First assets conveyed to First Security 
Financial for no consideration; plaintiffs Harris, Hansen, Nelson 
and Gordon have suffered anxiety and emotional distress; their 
reputations have been impaired, and they have been compelled to 
expend substantial sums of money and much of their time pursuing 
fruitless applications and submissions to Commissioner Weis. 
87. As a direct and proximate result of defendants1 
violations of law; including their fraudulent sale of securities, 
plaintiffs have been injured in their business and property and 
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have sustained actual damages the full extent of which cannot be 
presently calculated, but which exceeds the sum of $23,000,000. 
88. Plaintiffs1 damages include, but are not limited to: 
(a) increased development costs for Bel Marin Keys; (b) the loss 
of the going business value of the thrift institutions owned by 
the plaintiffs; (c) the loss incurred through expenditures for 
court costs and necessary legal expenses ;and (d) the loss of 
reputation as competent businessmen in the financial community. 
NINTH CLAIM 
.1/&V XIII. 
(Plaintiff Harris Against defendants Weis, Sutton, Larsen, 
and Throndsen for Defamation.) 
89. Plaintiff Harris hereby incorporates all of the 
allegations of this complaint into this claim. 
90. Harris was associated with the banking industry in 
Northern Utah for 21 years, from 1964 to 1985, during which time 
he acquired a valuable statewide and regional reputation as a 
competent, conservative and honest banking executive. His 
statewide reputation within the banking industry was enhanced by 
his tenure as a director of the Utah Bankers' Association from 
1983 to 1985. 
91. Harris had a business reputation in the State of Utah 
as a competent banker, worthy to hold positions of public trust. 
He served as a chairman of the Northern Division, Utah, American 
Cancer Society, and served on the Board of Directors of the Red 
Cross; for 30 years Harris has held leadership positions in the 
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LDS Church, exercising stewardship over church funds, and 
properties. 
92. Defendant Weis, on numerous occasions in September and 
October 1986, with no reasonable grounds for believing them to be 
true, made false and defamatory statements about Harris. The 
exact content of the statements are presently unknown to Harris, 
but the defamatory gist of the statements includes the following: 
(a) That Harris had taken $11,000,000 from 
Charter, that the bulk of the stolen funds were taken 
by Harris to Idaho, to build houses, and that Weis did 
not know Harris' whereabouts; 
(b) That Harris had run Citizens Bank as his own 
personal, private bank, that he had gutted Citizens 
financially and then started the same process on 
Charter. 
93. An ordinary listener would understand the defamatory 
statements to mean that Harris had absconded to places unknown 
with the funds of Charter and Citizens1 Bank, and could not be 
found by authorities. 
94. Weis knew the foregoing statements were false at the 
time she made them, because she knew that no funds were stolen, 
or otherwise wrongfully taken by Harris from Citizens1 Bank or 
from Charter. 
95. Weis knew, or should have known, that the demise of 
Citizens1 Bank was caused by a $9,000,000 real estate trade made 
in March or April 1985 by a director, Darwin Larsen, who was then 
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acting de facto, as the chief executive officer of Citizens1 
Bank. 
96. Moreover, Weis knew, or should have known, at the time 
she made the defamatory statements set forth above, that the FBI 
had investigated Citizens1 Bank after its closure in 1985 and 
reported no wrongdoing by Harris. 
97. In addition, Weis had a full time bank examiner from 
the Department of Financial Institutions of the State of Utah 
employed full time at Charter from approximately March, 1985 
until Weis seized Charter on June 30, 1986. During the entire 16 
months that her employee and representative was present at 
Charter, every transaction in which Harris was involved was 
examined in complete detail by him. Not once did the State 
examiner discover or report any wrongdoing by Harris. 
98. Furthermore, the Federal Reserve Bank audited the books 
and records of Citizens Bankshares, and all of its subsidiaries 
and affiliates, including Charter Thrift and Citizens' Bank, 
every year during the time Harris was involved with these 
entities. The last Federal Reserve review during the time Harris 
was involved with Charter and Citizens was conducted in June 
1985. At that time no defalcations were reported. Under its 
rules, as Weis knew, any misconduct, defalcation, 
misappropriation, or self dealing must be reported. No wrongful 
act, or questionable transactions by Harris or members of his 
family were found by the Federal Reserve. 
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99. In spite of the facts known to Weis, she made further 
false statements about Harris, announcing in October 1986 that 
the Department of Financial Institutions and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") were bringing criminal charges 
against Harris. At the time she made these statements, Weis had 
no reasonable grounds for believing them to be true. 
100. The ordinary listener would understand this statement 
to mean that criminal charges had been brought against Harris for 
wrongfully taking funds from Charter or Citizens1 Bank. 
Listeners did so understand Weisf statements. 
101. On or about September 15, 1986, on Channel 5 TV in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, defendant Sutton made false and defamatory 
statements about Harris, the exact content of which is unknown to 
Harris at this time, but the defamatory gist of which is that 
Harris had committed the most egregious defalcation in the 
history of the Department of Financial Institutions for the State 
of Utah. This statement was made soon after the conviction of 
Val Costley for embezzlement of $5,400,000 from Family Bank 
102. Ordinary listeners would understand Sutton's 
statements to mean that Harris had embezzled more than $5,400,000 
from Charter Thrift and Citizens1 Bank. Listeners did so 
understand Sutton's statements. 
103. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Sutton also 
falsely stated that Harris stole $11,000,000 which was the direct 
cause of the demise of Charter, and had used family, business 
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friends, and shell corporations to effect his thefts. Such 
statements were false in their entirety. 
104. At the time he made the statements Sutton had no 
reasonable grounds for believing them to be true. 
105. At the time Weis and Sutton made the statements 
alleged herein they knew that such statements would be 
republished by others, and they made the defamatory statements 
intending that such republications would occur. 
106. The defamatory statements originated by Weis and 
Sutton were republished by defendants Larsen and Throndsen, who 
made such republications with knowledge that the statements were 
false. 
107. Such statements proximately caused Harris special 
damages to his business and property, including but not limited 
to curtailment of credit, denial of loan applications, and 
demands for additional collateral, disruption of a partnership, 
and the creation of additional burdens in all of Harris' business 
dealings, all to his damage in an amount subject to proof at 
trial, but not less than $7,000,000 as to each defendant. 
108. Defendants1 statements have caused Harris to be 
shunned and avoided, and have caused disruption in his family 
relationships, created anxiety, and emotional distress, all to 
Harris1 damage in an amount subject to proof at trial, but in no 
event not less than $8,500,000 as to each defendant. 
109. Weis, Sutton, Larsen and Throndsen published the 
foregoing defamatory statements about Harris willfully, 
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purposefully and maliciously. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to 
punitive damages according to proof, but in no event less than 
$10,000,000 as to each defendant. 
XIV. 
(Against all Defendants Under Utah Racketeering 
Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act) 
110. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the allegations 
of this complaint into this claim. 
111. The actions of the defendants and each of them, as 
alleged herein, constitute violations of Utah Code Ann. Section 
76-10-1601 et. seq. (1953), as amended, and are the legal and 
factual causes of injury for which the defendants are liable and 
actual damage of no less than $2,400,000 each as to Plaintiffs 
Harris, Thrift Holding Company and Charter Thrift & Loan, and 
$10,700,000 each as to Plaintiffs Nelson, Hansen, Gordon, Murray 
First Thrift £ Loan, MFT Financial, and $1,000,000 as to 
Plaintiff MFT Mortgage, which sum should be trebled, and for 
costs of suit, reasonable attorneys' fees and punitive damages. 
XV. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment as follows: 
1. Under the FIRST through EIGHTH, and the ELEVENTH CLAIM, 
for such general and special damages jointly and severally 
against each and every defendant above named defendant as may be 
established at the trial, but in no event less than $2,400,000 
each in favor of Plaintiffs Harris, Thrift Holding Company and 
40 
O * N *-\ r~* r~* JJOO 
Charter Thrift & Loan, and $10,700,000 each in favor of 
Plaintiffs Nelson, Hansen, Gordon, Murray First Thrift & Loan, 
MFT Financial, and $1,000,000 as to Plaintiff MFT Mortgage, 
trebled on the SIXTH, SEVENTH, and EIGHTH CLAIMS against all 
defendants except the State of Utah. 
2. Under the SIXTH and SEVENTH CLAIMS, an injunctive order 
divesting all defendants from any interest in the property or 
future conduct of the enterprise, including divestiture of any 
trusteeships or receiverships exercised by defendant Weis in her 
capacity as trustee conservator receiver, or however 
characterized, and the ILGC. 
3« Under the NINTH CLAIM for such general and special 
damages against each and every defendant above named as may be 
established at the trial, but in no event less than $7,000,000 
special damages, $8,500,000 general damages and $10,000,000 each 
in favor of Plaintiff Harris. 
4. Under the EIGHTH and TENTH CLAIMS, for reasonable 
attorneysf fees. 
5. From an order of this court making Charter Thrift £ 
Loan and Thrift Holding Company parties plaintiff to this action. 
6. For such other and further relief, including court 
costs, as the court deems just. 
DATED this 15th day of January, 1988. 
Lch^dPjT 
btefney f 
Ta aj^J. Leedy 
At n  for P l a i n t i f f s 
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